Introduction
The beginning of research on the functioning of conversations and other forms of talk-in-interaction can be dated back to the late 60's, a period where this subject became a more or less autonomous field of research. This research has now reached maturity (provided that one accepts this anthropomorphic metaphor...). Although I do not intend to give a 'state of the art' survey, I would like to consider here some of the recent developments in interactional linguistics. A preiiminary question is: given a definition of this field as covering any study approaching whatever form of talk-in-interaction on whatever perspective, what conventional term should be used for labelling this field? French literature commonly uses'analyse des interactions verbales'2 (in English:
'verbal interactions analysis', that is 'ViA'). It is doubtless, anyhow, that in our perspective 'conversation analysis' is too restrictive, for two reasons: -considering the object of investigation, 'conversations' are only one of the numerous different types of verbal interactions (even though one can admit it to be prototypical)3; -considering the methodological aspects, 'CA' refers to a particular approach which is well defined from both a historical and methodological point of view; but interaction analyses are also based on other descriptive traditiois than ethnomethodology -let us quote, among others: symbolic interactionism (Goffman) , the ethnography of communication (Hymes), interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz), discourse analysis as represented by Labov & Fanshel, or Sinclair & Coulthard ('school of Birmingham') , and more recently by the 'school of Geneva' (the so called 'hierarchical model' elaborated by E. Roulet). . . Verbal interactions analysis, when considered extensively, has been characterized from the very beginning by an extreme variety of the recommended approaches. This variety was later both reduced (since CA soon became the 'hard core' of this field in t This is a revised version of my paper presented at the 5th International Pragmatics Conference organized by IPrA (Mexico City, July 4th-9th 1996) . Some criticisms were voiced at this lecture. I have taken these observations into account for this second version. I am very thankful to E. Schegloff for his remarks which made me aware of the misunderstandings which some tbrmulations in my original paper could lead to. Some of these misunderstandings were the result of imprecise translation. This present version of my work has been entirely corrected by Giuseppe Manno, whose kind and thorough collaboration I am sincerely thankful for. 2 By verbal interaction I refer to any form of communicative exchange which is produced mainly by linguistic means. 3 Initially, specialists of CA used 'conversation' in an inclusive way for designating any type of verbal interaction (Schegloff 1968 : 1075 . They pref'er now as a generic term 'talk-ininteraction', which in effect is preferable in all respects.
C atheine Kerbrat -Ore c c hioni strengthening and refining its analytical tools), and increased -particulariy since interactionism, having crossed the borders of the USA where it was born. became progressively implanted in other countries, where it was exposed to local intluences. Thus, whereas in the USA the analysis of verbal interactions has developed mainly in the field of sociology, in France, it was adopted principailv by linguists, where, as a result, there is a strong link between conversation analysis and discourse analysis. In the present article, I would like to emphasize the following two aspecrs occurring within the said variety on the interactionist scene: l. the variety concerning the interactional genres that are submitted to investigation 2. the variety concerning the explored levels of analysis, and I shall be dealing more specifically with: -the mechanism of three-party conversations concerning 1.
-and the question of face-work and politeness concerning 2.
1. Interactional genres 1.1. The concerns of CA are above all 'general'. The aim in the first place is to identify from among a large variety of natural data the mechanisms underlying the functioning of any form of talk-in-interaction. As far as the turn-taking system is concerned, foi example, Sacks & al. consider that the main question is:
;IiT#':il ?: Hil::o;?"",'"x".To,iTffi:":*:il.":il:JJ:?"ii:#:
particularities of content or context. " (1978:10) This objective is without doubt eminently justified. However, one can also be interested in some particular type of interaction or other and try to make out the specificity of its functioning with respect to contextual features. In this sense, we note that interactionists initially privileged some communicative genres, such as interactions in classrooms, in medical settings or in courtroom settings. Subsequently however, there was considerable diversification of the subjects submitted to analysis, and today, one can hardly find any type of speech event which has not been given attention by ipecialists -both informal interactions and the most institutionahzed ones4. Let us mention at random: the big famrly of interactions in media or service encounters (shops of any kind, banks, post offices, ticket offices at the subway station, etc.); interactions in working situations (at the office, in companies, in factories, in garages) + See for example Vincent 1995, for the analysis of a'forgotten' type of communicative situation, and yet a frequent one: the most ordinary oral activity which accompanies the most trivial domestic activities -Vincent shows that it represents a sort of challenge to the conversational rules which are generally assumed, such as the principle oIconditional relevance (although they are not soliloques, some moves are actually not made in order to sollicit any reaction fiom the other participants who are present in the communicative soace). 5 The analyst's task here is to see how discourse which is exchangeci in different situations of this kind facilitates the circulation of knowledge and know-how, the coordination of everyone's activity, and the solution of the problems that one comes across during the execution of the task -cf. in France, the research of the team 'Langage et travail', which brings to light the complexity of the functioning of those communicative situations which are characterized by an entanglement of the semiotic practices (mixture sometimes of written and spoken language, and also mixture in this 'action language' of gestures and words).
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The variational factors which are likely to contribute to the foundation of a tvpology of the interactional genres are numerous and various (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1990: lll-133) . We shall be dealing here with one of these factors, thar is to say, the number of participants. In fact, although Sacks had envisaged the possibility of studying muiti-party conversations per se (1992-I, 533: "attention has to be paid directly, independently, to multi-party conversations"). this project has not vet been carried out. as far as I know. In particular, the case of three-party conversations (from now on triLogue) has unjustly been neglected up to now, compared with the case of tdtei-t€te conversations (and even in comparison with multi-party conversations)6.
In fact. one could provide many pieces of evidence for the general tendency, rvhich is more often unconscious, to identify communication (as in the Jakobsonian perspectlve) with interaction between two persons. Let us consider for instance the fact thatdespite its etvmolog)'7,'dialogue'is often understood as two-party interaction: there is no doubt that this is owing to the confusion between the paronymic prefixes 'dia-' and'di-', but also to this tendency to unduly assimilate interaction to dual interaction, considered as the prototype of any kind of interaction -and yet triadic organizations do not play an insignificant role in our societies (let us think, for example, about the family trio and many other types of ordinary situations; about teievision debates with a moderator, interactions with an interpreter or with any other type of mediator...). Admittedly, the basis of the communicative experience of a speaker (or of 'intersubjectivity', as Benveniste terms it) is the discovery of 'the other', and at this level it does not really matter if this 'other' is singular or plural. But as soon as one is interested in "the technical organization of talk in interaction", it is clear that this organization "is sensitive to the number of participants" (Schegloff 1995:3i) and that 'trilogues' function in many respects differently from 'dilogues'8.
Starting from this point, we began in 1993 to investigate trilogues9. Our aim was to determine the properties which govern the way a trilogue proceeds in comparison with a dilogue, rvith the help of the different instruments available within the 'VIA'.
These specificities have been studied at all levels in these types of conversational organization. The following generalizations were made throufi the observation of a large range of data. nine theoretically possible interlocutive situations in the trilogue, as opposed to the two in the dilogue:
Pt -> P2,P I -> P3, Pl -> P2+P3, P2 -> P 1, P2 -> P3, P2 -> P l+P3, P3 -> P 1, P3 -> P2, P3 -> P I +P2. However, it is important to add that not only does the configuration of these pattern Jluctuate in the course of the same utterance (as Goodwin well demonstratedl2), but it is also somettmes Juzzy. In other words, it is not always possible to determine whether the different hearers stay in a hierarchical relationship or not, and in which way, since: -among the allocution cues, some are clear and discrete, but they are not systematically present (like terms of addressl3), whereas others (like gaze direction in face-to-face interaction) are, on the contrary, constant but sometimes difficult to interpret; -these cues do not necessarily converge.
Let us imagine, for instance, the 'real' scene (it happens to quadrilogue and not a trilogue) that the following extract in Proust's Guermantes is supposed to evokel4: We see how the hierarchy of cues allows us to organrze a correlative hierarchy of the hearers: 1. Marcel (cues: "your grandmother", and obviously the gaze, which is not mentioned by the narrator) 2. The doctor du Boulbon (cue: the tone of the voice, which is analyzed by the narrator) 3. The grandmother (cue: the content of the sentence, which 'concerns' her directly).
But are things really so clear? We realize that in fact, it is the doctor who takes over the utterance, without producing any effect of intrusion at all. It seems, therefore, that there is in the mother's utterance a clash between the hearer to whom it is apparently addressed (in accordance with the principal cues of allocution, verbal and non-verbal), and the hearer whom it is principally meant fori. e., this kind of enunciative mechanism (well attested in literature as well as in ordinary life) which I personally term 'communicative trope' (in French trope communicationne[)|s.
l2 S"" tor instance the analysis he proposes (1981: 160-166) of the utterance "I gave up smoking cigarettes one week ago today, actually", delivered to three successive recipients, and conelatively 'redesigned' thowever the main aim of Goodwin is to account for the progressive construction of turn depending on the recipient's receptivity and on what he supposes to be his state of knowledge, whereas our perspective is rather interpretative). 13 Ter*r of address in French are used rather rarely (significantly more rarely than in English, for example). l4 Folio 1988: 293. l5 Cf. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1990: 92-8) . In general, it is the application of the principle of relevance which allows us to identify the'communicative trope'. The production/interpretation of the trope is also usually influenced by considerations of face-work (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992'.212-3).
be in this case a novel Le C6td de In all events, instead of opposing, as Goffman does, 'addressed' and'nonaddressed.', it is preferable to speak, more cautiously, of 'principal'vs'secondary' addresseei6 Let us add two more ooinrs: -If P2 and P3 are the two non-ipeakers, all degrees can be found concerning their hrerarchy as addressees of the utterance of Pl, the two extreme cases beine repreftnted. on the one hand, by their equality of status (it is the collective address) anO-on the other hand, by the total exclusion of P2 (or P3) from the interlocutive circuit (his/her'excommunication').
-As for the utterance's value as a speech act: the same utterance may not only change its value during the conversation according to the fluctuations of its addressee (an initftl information being for example reconverted into a demand for confirmation; cf. Goodwin l98l), but it may also simultaneously convey different pragmatic values for its diJJ'erent hearers. This idea has already been expressed by Sacks (Lectures vol.I: 530-4 and vol. II:99-l0l): an utterance directed at B may well "do something" to C, and something different from what it does to B (for instance, if A flirts with B, "then she may be teasing C"). The same idea has also been developed by Clark and Carlson (1982) 17, within a perspective close to the'standard'speech acts theory, but also criticai of this theory, which 'forgets' that when a statement has several iddressees, "speakers perform illocutionary acts not only toward addressees. but also toward certain other hearers" (p. 333): for these 'lateral' hearers, such acts always have at least the value of an informative act, and often some additional values. Thus, in the last example from Proust, the mother's utterance simultaneously has the following pragmatic values : l. Concerning Marcel, it is a suggestion, and an indirect request. 2. Concerning du Boulbon, it is a request for permission. 3. Concerning the grandmother, it is a piece of information, perhaps coupled with a request for agreement. As Clark and Carlson show, the existence of parallel circuits dramatically complicates the description of speech acts, in particular of indirect speech acts:
"With ordinary linear indirectness, utterances can become very complicated; but with lateral indirectness, the possibilities almost defy imagination" (p. 364)
I .2.2. Tu rn-rakin g or ganizat ion
Let us recall the main specificities of trilogues in this respect -by referring first to the works of CA and to the framework they developed, which is conceived for an unspecified number of participants but also allows us to account for variation depending on the number of the parties (concerning the particular case of three parties, see the seminal artrcle of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1978 23).
-As for the alternating pattern, the famous ababab formula only works for dilogues, whereas for trilogues the alternation does not respect any kind of fixed rules: wE are dealing with_an infinite number of possibilities, the ahcabcabc model being very exceptional (Sacks 1992 -II: 523.4, Speier 1912 400, Schegloff 1995 . Likewise, whereas for dilogues the inequality of participants srems only (as far as this organizational level is concerned) from the length of turns, in trilogues this rnequality consists also in the number of tums which are produced by each pariicipant.
-In regard to the selection of the next speaker: as soon as there are more than two participants, there are two possibilities, called in the SSJ model 'other-selection' vs 'self-selection'respectively. Now, in the first case, P1 may select P2, whereas it is P3 who takes over the floor (these attempts to cause interference in the interlocutive relation are constant, for instance, when a juvenile magistrate questions a charged child in the presence of his or her mother, cf. de Fornel 1986: I11-8). We are then dealing with a kind of violation of the turn system which is unknown in dilogue. I call this l6 Similarly, Goodwin speaks of 'focaladdress' (i981: 163). r/Rcflned in Clark (1996) . phenomenon intrusionts. and it must be added to the other types of 'failures', rntentional or not, which are alreadv familiar to dilogues, but which are more likely to occur in trilogues, that is to say, interruption and overlaple (as for lapse -i. e. abnormally prolonged gap between two turnsthis case is more delicate: its occurrence seems to be both reduced. since the number of the potential speakers is higher, and increased, since everyone may rely, sometimes mistakenly, on the other to resume).
In conclusion trilogLtes are potentially more conflicting organil,ations than diLogues (since there are numerous more opportunities to struggle for the floor), and ttt the snme time Less corttpelling J'or each participanl as the obligation to co-operate. being somehow shared out within the group, is weaker for each speaker taken individuallycf. Goffman ( 197 4: 540) :
"Numbcrs thcmselvcs reduce the communication obligation of any' one recipient".
Goffman echoing here Jean-Jacques Rousseau who mentioned the obligations of dilogues in the following terms (Confessions, 3rd book).
"Dans Ie t)te ti t€te il v a un ctutre irtconviriettt, c'est lq nlcessitl cle parler toujours; quand ott vous parle ilJ'aut relpondre, et si I'on ne dit mot ilJaut relever la conversation. Cette insupportable contrainte m'efit seuLe digofttd de la societ!: c'est asse: qu'iL failLe absoLument que je pctrle pour rTue je dise une sottise infailLiblentent".
"ln t€te-)-t€te conversations there is an another disadvantage, which is the necessity to constantly speak: when someone talks to you, you have to answer, and if the other one does not say a word, vou have to sustain conversation. Only this unbearable sonstraint would have filled me with disgust for society: I only have to be under the obligation to speak and I inevitably say silly things". L2.3. The strttcturing of dialogue N.B. For us, this structuring is a specific organizational level compared with turn. It is the level where semantic and pragmatic coherence is established, which is generally described in terms of hierarchical 'ranks' of pragmatic units2o. The inferior unit is the speech act (more or less revised and corrected in a conversational perspective), and the superior unit is conversation as a whole. In this perspective, the key-unit is the 'exchange' (smallest dialogal unit), which is constituted by 'interventions' or 'moves'
(an intervention being a contribution of a given speaker to a given exchange). As intervention does not coincide with turn (which can consist of several interventions), similarly the exchange is not a sequence of turns: it is a groLlp of units whose definition is pragmatic and whose relationship is both one of sequentiality and complementarity, rvhereas the relationship between turns is purely and simply a reiationship of order. After this preliminary remark, what are at this level the main features of trilogues compared with dilogues'l l8 Fo, more infbrmation about this phenomenon, see Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1990: 180-2. l9 Ft,, simultaneous talk and the difterent patterns of overlap (some of which involve at least three participants), see Schegloff (1995: 35-.10) . I would lust like to stress that a line of research that we have just begun on certain types of polylogues (radio debates about cinema with an average of six participants) contradicts Schegloffs statement according to whom "it is empirically the case that more than one speaker is almost always two speakers at a time" (p.40): in our data, overlaps of three or even four voices are not rare -it is, horvever, tikely that this vanation is due to the difference of cultural context. In any case, this question begs lurther investi-uation. 20 S." for this organization Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1990: chap. 4) , and Roulet & al. (1985) , who present two conceptions which are slightly different. The Geneva model is characterized by its power in accounting for r subordinrtive relationship which is established even at a distance between the constituents of dialogue.
l' The most salient fact is that in trilogues the function of borh initiative and reactive move is o.ften accomplisheil b1' nvo constituenritr. Thi, giu.s rise, for example, to the following patterns:
..11., question to 11 -p2 s question to p3 /p3,s answer,,, or else: "Pl's question to p2 and p3'/p2's answer -pJ'; onr*.r".
In the last case. the two reactions can be independent: This gives rise to the theoretical and descriptive problem of deciding whether in these cases we are dealing with two different contribitions within the saile -ou., or with two different moves ll?ying rhe same,s.tructurar pair within rh; ";;;;g", u"a which may have extremely different relationsnros.
This problem will not be discussed hire in detail; suffice it to say yer again rhat, as soon as there are three participants, things become .onsid"rabty morJ Jo*pii"ut.o.
? Tltt question of completeness or incompleteness of exchanges, a delicate matter even in dilogues (for conversational grammar rs often fuiry'-i"a the correlative expectations /r This phenomenon has often been mentioned -for instance, by Jeanneret ( 1991 Jeanneret ( , 1996 by the name of 'co-€nonciation'; or by conversation analysts by the nu*" of '1oint production,or.collaborative utterance' (there are in particular a certain number of studies on 'co-tellership' in the storytelling activity) However' in all these studies it does not appear clearly which is the status of the jointly constructed units: utterances, turns or moves? (in Lernei'199 l, for instance, the author uses alternatively 'sentence','utterance' and'turn'...) Similarly it is not clear, either, how 'parties' are defined in Schegloff's (1995: 40) statemenr: ..rurntaking organizes the distribution of talk among parties, but not among the persons who compose a party,, -which allows him to reduce the number-of participants, and-ihlreby re-estabtish order into ..this potentially chaotic circumstance" represented by multi-party conversatlons. As fbr us, we consrder that turns are assumed by speakers (persons of flesh and 6lood), even if these speak.r, -uy sometrmes assoclate themselves in adopting some or other conversational role or task -but this pertains to another Ievel of functioning. '/ See in our collective wo.rk Le,trilogue the study of rraverso, from whom these examples are taken, and who proposes a detailed typology of the different organizations of the exchanges in trilogues.
C at herine Ke rbrat -Orecc hioni are rather vague)23, turns out to be still more complex in trilogues, particularly when the initial move is bi-addressed. In this case, it can theoretically be supposed that the move requires two reactions and that the organizational norm of the exchange is actually a triplet (rather than an adjacency pair). But in fact where there is only one reaction, the absence of the second one is not always'noticeable', and it may even be quite normal. It all depends on a number of factors such as: -the nature of the initiative move: as tor offer, for instance, this absence produces an effect of something missing -we shall say that the exchange is 'truncated': The study of talk-in-interaction 9 the place where a particular relationship between interactors is set up -of distance or familiarity, of dominance or equality, of complicity or conflict... Viewed from this angle, and with regard to dilogues. trilogues present a certain number of specific features. I shall only consider one of them here: the possibility for the members of the triad to make up coalitions and at the same time to modify the relations of dominance.
In his own perspective as a social psychologist, Caplow (1968) demonstrated how a coalition of two elements against a third one may "transform strength into weakness and weakness into strength". From a linguistic point of view, one can attempt to describe, for example, how these coalitions form and break up (for in ordinary conversations, coalitions are usually moving and the reversals of alliances are very common), one can also describe how they take shape and what the main markers of a coalition in the studied trilogue are -personal pronouns vve and you, demonstrations of agreement, operations of prompting the partner (by which the allied speaker assists his or her partner when he or she gets lexically stuck), or else argumentative assistance (the ally sLrpplies his partner with co-oriented statements), etc. One may be interested too in cases in which the constitution of a coalition is subjected to a negotiation between participants: Pl may offer his or her services to P2 who declines them (which seriously threatens Pl's face). There may also be a misunderstandlng between the involved pafties; example -a discussion between three students, two girls (G1 , G2) and a boy (B), about the topic of what are called 'grandes 6coles' in France)25: The debate takes place between B (who defends the idea that the sacrifice required for preparing the competitive entrance examination for the 'grandes dcoles' is worth making, since it allows afterwards to "have it easy" throughout one's life), and Gl (who defends the opposing idea of carpe diem: there is nothing which justifies the sacrifice of one's beautiful youth). G2, who had remained silent until this point, finally enters into the discussion and gives her opinion -but in which way? B interprets first (and so does the analyst) "you have to sacrifice yourself ' as an echo of his own discourse, and 25 Dutu collected by Zamouri (whose contribution to the volume on triiogues focuses on this notion of coalition).
he immediately outbids (too earlyl) by overlapping ("you have to sacrifice yourself ol cortrse"), but G2 continues: "and that's not right". With astonishment we discover that in fact G2 has just constituted an arsumentative coalition rvith Gl, and Gl takes immediate advantage of it by agreeing through echoing: "and that's not right".
After having noted the high intricacy of the different levels of conversations, since the interpretation made by speakers of what is going on at the level of the constitution of coalitions may determine their taking the floor, we shall propose some conclusive elements concerning the general mechanics of trilogues: l. For the analyst, trilogues have an organization which is more difficult to describe than dilogues. This reflects the fact that for the participants themselves, coping with trilogues is more delicate than with dilogues, purely and simply because in trilogues, the reception party is essentially heterogeneous.In particular, the various participants do not generally share the same'conversational history': if we call (following Golopentia 1988) 'CH' the ordered set of conversations which has taken place between two or several speakers, it appears that trilogues are set within four CH's: CH (P1-P2), CH (P1-P3), CH (P2-P3) and CH (P1-P2-P3). In trilogues, the main work a speaker has to do is coping as best he can with that heterogeneity, sometimes at the cost of some contortions-for example, to apply Gricean maxims, since doing so depends entirely on what the speaker supposes his two addressees know, and they do not necessarily both have the same state of knowledge (a classical example: Pl telling P2 a story or a joke in the presence of P3 who already knows it). Trilogues require thus a superior know-how to the one that t€te-A-tete situations require for the same task. But at the same time, trilogues provide them wrth additional available resources: for instance, when the main addressed is not paying attention, the speaker may make use of some technique available in dilogues too (like self-interruption), but he may also look for a more receptive addressee in reshaping the utterance to make it more appropriate for him or her, following a mechanism which has been brought to light by Goodwin (1981: chap. 5) 2. The number of participants in a conversation strongly affects the way it functions: -in dilogues, both parties are supposed to remain actively involved in the exchange throughout its process; -four-party conversations (and a fortiori conversations which include even more participants) are characterized by the possibility of a'schism', that is to say the constitution of two separate conversational groups; -the trilogue rs an intermediary structure which is characterized by the fact that the triad may be divided into an active duo + a'third party', who stays out of the conversation and may piay different roles: a completely passive witness, or an arbitrator, or more perversely, the part of the 'tertius gaudens' (to use Caplow's term), who derives benefit from conflicts which are likely to arise within the triad; or else a destabilizing part, like in Jean-Paul Sartre's play Huis C/os which depicts an infernal triad r.vhere each party in turn plays the executioner to the other two. As a matter of fact, it seems that this splitting mechanism is extremely frequent and that trilogues mostly resemble a succession of turning dilogues -but which take place right under the watchful eyes of a third party; and that makes all the difference. in otheiwords, 'real' trilogues are exceptional, if by it one means an organization in which each participant speaks in turn also taking his or her two interlocutors into consideration, i. e.: P1-> P2 + P3 then P2-> Pl +P3 then P3-> Pl + P2, etc. Such an arrangement is rare in natural conversations and never lasts long: very quickly, rhe triangle comes apart, either because of the expulsion of a third party temporarily put
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The main fearure of trilogues is their instability, their flexibility and their unpredictability. They are therefore more difficult to describe than dilogues which are "much blandei" according to Sacks, but they could also be "much more interesting" (1992-l:533;zo. 3. These few considerations have allowed us to also see that conversations may be considered at differents levels of functioning, which are both autonomous and connected.
Politeness in interaction
The works carried out within the framework of CA mainly deals with the levels of conversation which may be called organizational21 (turn-system, repair activities, sequential organization. etc.). Some reiearchers, however. were more interested in exploring the"relational Ieve\, that is, the way the interpersonal relation (distance, po'*'.r, eTc.) is constructed and negotiated during the course of interaction. Abundant iit.rutrr. about this question can be found28, and these studies were enriched in the late 70's with a new range of studies, that is to say, all research on politeness phenomena, which has been said"to be "one of the most important and productive areas of research in pragmatics and sociolinguistics". (Preisler & Haberland 1984: 227) . Thus, in the t..*J'parr of my articlel I should like to deal with-politeness ^-after.having mentionad the recent arousal of interest in still another dimension of interaction: the emotional constituent (see for instance the numerous studies on interjections and exclamations, Wierzbicka's work on the conceptualization of emotions in different languages and cultures, Tannen's or Blum-Kulka's on the notion of involvement', Auchlin's on 'conversational happiness', etc.: emotions are obviously fashionable nowadays). But let's return to the question of politeness. As is well-known, it is impossible to talk about it without reflrring to Brown and Levinson's theory2e. This th_eory is extremely famous, abundantly applied, and correlatively, sometimes criticized. I would Iike to say the following on this topic.
2.1. To begin with, I think B-L's theory is relevant in its principle: politeness is actually an"d fundamentally a matter of faces, of face-want and of face-work -facework consisting of u s"t of strategies which help to reconcile face-want with the fact that most of t[e acts that we are induced to perform during interaction are 'facetlueatening'. That does not necessarily mean that everything in interaction amounts to a question o"f face (many other 'wantsr are involved), but that as soon as one wonders about the degree of poiiteness or impoliteness of any statement, one comes across the idea of face or something similar. So, for me, this p5int of view on politeness is consistent with the intuition that one has of the phenomenon, with the oidinary-useof the word 'politeness', and also with all the various reflections which can be found in pre-scientific literature on the topic (handbooks on good manners in particular). It has proved, at any rate' to be more 26 ln fa.t here, Sacks compares dilogues with all kinds of multi-party conversations, and not only trilogues. 27 Oi else, quoring Sacks' terms ( 1984: 413-4) , levels which pertain to "technology of conversation". 28 Cf. L., interactions verbales, vol. 2: First Part. For a recent contribution on the study of the power dimension in interaction, see Diamond 1996. 29 Oth., pragmaticians have contributed to the constitution of this area of research, like R. Lakoff or G.
Leech.
satisiying than the alternative niodels that have been recently put forward -I shall mention two of them: -Fraser and Nolen's model (1981) . according to which polrteness corresponds to the respect tor the 'conversational contract' within the terms of which speakers operate in a given communication situation: if they abide by that contlact, they are polite, if they transgress one or more of the contractuai terms. they become impolite; but no utterance can be .said to be inherently polite or impolite. Horvever, I think that thanks are intrinsicaLly more polite than orders. and that apologies are intrinsically more polite than insults. Admittedly, in order to become a reality, this potential value needs some appropriate contextuai conditions: the most exquisite thanks may spoil their effect if they are out of place, and, conversely, a shouted order rnay lose its impolite value (without becoming polite in the processl) in certain circumstances where it is not out of place (like military training). The politeness-effect (or impoliteness-effect) is highly context-dependent, but that rs not a reason tor assimilating politeness to adjustment to the context: Fraser's definition is too general.
-On the other hand, Arndt and Janney's definition (1985) is far too restrictive, since it assimilates politeness to emotional communication, and to demonstrations of 'supportiven-ess'. But all ernotional demonstrations are not polite, and all polite behavior does not impiy a particular emotional involvement: consequentiy, both phenomena can in no way be considered as being the same.
2.2. So, for the time being, B-L's theory has no other serious competitors on the 'politeness market'. However, to become still more effective and, in particular, to be irble to achieve its universal ambitions, it seems to me that the model must undergo a certain nttmber of revisions.3o
The main impediment to the correct working of B-L's model rs the extrerne fuzziness tlnt surrounds the negative/positive notions.In fact, these predicates apply to two different objects:
'face' and 'politeness'.
1. As fer as face is concerned: -'negative face' corresponds more or less to Goffman's and ethology specialists' notion of 'territory':
-'positive face' roughly corresponds to the ordinary language 'face' that can be lost or saved: it is pride, sense of honor, narcissism and so on. So, why then rename 'territory' and 'face' as 'negative face' and 'positive face' respectively. expressions that could imply that there might be a relation of opposition between those two entities, when they are, in fact, two complementary constituents of any social subject? The answer is: in order to correlate them (unduly I think) with two forms of politeness, positive politeness and negative politeness. 2. As far as politeness is concerned: -Negative politeness is first oriented towards the satisfaction of the negative face needi but Brown and Levinson add that this form of politeness is mainly ivoidancebased', and that is where r,ve discover the motivation for their terminological choice: when it concerns territory, face-want exclusively amounts to a preservation desire, and correlatively, face-work exciusiveiy amounts to avoidance or redressive action (cf. 1981 , 129 : "Negative politeness is redressing action addressed to the addressee's negative face"). Therefore, there is a kind of terminological take-over by force whereby the notion of territory (negative face) is assimilated to negative politeness, in the sense certain anthropologists or sociologists like Durkheim understand it. that is to say the carrying out of avoidance rituals. But this assimilation is excessive since, if territory actually is an object of preservation desire, it can also lend itself to an expansion desire (that the l0 Th" follorving criticisms and propositions are in part coherent with those made by other scholars, like Craie & al. 1986 or Penman 1990 gift. for instance, is out to satisfy, by making t positive ritual to the addressee's ile.qutiv'e iace). -The same argllment can be applied to the positive face. rvhich is the scene of both a presen'ation and gratification desire, whereas Brown and Levin.son put the stress particularly on rts propensrtv to be enhanced. assimilating positive face and positive politeness this time -rvhereas I think we can have: 'negative politeness torvards the addressee's negative face (e.g. soflening of an order), 'positive politeness towards hts/her negative face (e.g. a gift), 'negative politeness torvards his/her positive face (e.g. softening of a criticism or drsagreement), 'positive politeness towards his/her positive face (e.g. compiiment, expression of agreement, etc.).
Let us mention that Brown and Levinson have made another shift r.vhich consists in assirnilating positive politeness to distance reduction, that is to say, to an ethos of warmth and solidarity, and negative politeness to a distance keeping and a standotfishness ethos. So that in the end, negative politeness and positive politeness may be dished up in every shape, and that is what characterizes the Brown-Levinson inheritance: from the same theoretical model, different authors happen to say totally different things about the same fact (as Meier 1995 has shown with regard to apology, and many other examples of confusions and contradictions could be taken into account; for example, for some researchers, in keeping with Brown and Levinson, deference is a matter of negative politeness, when others consider that, since it enables us to enhance other people's faces by using 'honorific' formulas, deference is, on the contrary, a matter of positive politeness.,.). The original model is obviously in part responsible for sucn lnconslstency ln lts appllcatlons.
To conclude with these criticisms, I shall say that Brown and Levinson's way of looking at politeness is far too restrictive. In their diagram of the five 'super-strategies' avarlable to perform FTAs, only the 2nd and the 3rd cases are considered to pertain to politeness, that is to say only cases of 'on-record, with redressive action' accomplishments. However I think that some cases have wrongly been excluded: -avoidance of a possible FTA -off-record performing (let us remember how vague the boundary between on-and offrecord is, since for those researchers it coincides with the one that divides the conventional and non-conventional indirect formulations of speech acts) -and the cases in which politeness practice is based on the performance of acts which are not FTAs: fortunately enough, politeness cannot confine itself to keeping everyone's aggressiveness within reasonable limits! That is the heart of the matter: the view that B-L's model gives of politeness and of the mechanics of interactions in general. is very negative, pessimistic and even -as it has been said -'paranoid' since interactors are presented as being individuals under the permanent threai of all kinds of FTAs, anci sp^ending their timJmounting guard over their territories and their faces. In this resDect. it is revealins that. in their intent to recycle the notion of speech act into the perspective of a ling"uistic politeness theory, Brorvn and Levinson have only considered acts which potentially threaten the addressee's faces, and omitted the acts that are used to enhance these faces, like wishes, thanks or compliments -compliments which are only viewed by them as a threat for the addressee's negative face insofar as they express desire ior the praised object... But without denying that this act may sometimes have that tinge, a compliment constitutes first andforeftnst flattering behavior towards the other person, that is, an anti-threat.
For this reason I think that it is essential to introduce an additional term into the theoretical model to refer to these acts which are in a way the positive counterparts of FTAs. At first, I had referred to these acts as'anti-FTAs', but that designation inconveniently maintains a certain dissymmetry in the system, still giving FTAs the privilege to be the unmarked e le ments of the opposition. So. I har.,e finally named them FEAs 1i.e. Face Enhancing Acts).
2.3. It is now time to briefly present my own propositions of rer,'isions of B-L's model: they essentially consist in accurately dissociating negative/positive face and ne gativ e /positiv e po lite nes s .
2.3. I. Ne gutive v.s po.sitive .f-uce.s -Negative face is then all the 'territories of the self' (Goffman) -bodily, sparial or temporal territories, any kind of 'reserves', material or co_gnitive... -Posrtive face is all the enhancing images that speakers try to make up of themselves in interaction.
The acts that participants are induced to perform in the course of conversation may have negative (FTAs) or positive (FEAs) effects on the faces. The .same act may of course come under several categories at the same time; rf lve take for example the act of the declaratiort oJ' love3t : 'for the 'declarer', it is a double FTA: for his/her negative face, since the speaker reveals something that until then he had kept secret, and in doing so, is compelled to a certain number of obligations; and for his/her positive face, since the confession of having 'tallen in love' sets the declaror in a 'lower position'. and makes him/her run the dreadfully mortifying risk of a refusal from the loved one;
. for the 'declaree', it is a FTA for his/her negative tace (an 'incursive' and act), but also a FEA for his/her positive face (since, in general, it is fairly 'impositive' flattering to hear that someone ioves you).
As anyone can see, the number of speech act categories that can such basis is considerable. Let us add that: be made up on -the different constituents of a given act may receive a variable 'weighting' (in the case of a compliment for instance, it seems obvious to me that the constituent 'addressee's positive face FEA'is generally heavier than the constituent'addressee's negative face FTA'); -the composition of a given act may be modulated in the context. which may change the proportion of the ingredients of the act, and even sometimes reverse its prevailing value.
But as a linguist, what is essential for me on this matter is that the formulation of a speeclt act totally depends on its FTNFEA status (which depends itself on both the context and the intrinsic features of the act), a status which explains for instance the very general disposition of FTAs to be softened and minimtzed -example of criticism the very general dispositron of FEAs to be hardened and maximized -examole of thanks:
"Thanks a lot/ tliank you very much/ (ever) so much/ a million/ I can't thank you enough"'rl but the ungrammaticality of *"a few thanks" is unexplained without any reference to the politeness system; (as for offers, the very fact that they may be both hardened and softened'. "Come on, lrave a little morel" can easily be explained by their basicallv hybrid nature, since they associate FTA and FEA equally). sub.;cct in Urbino (ltaty) in Juty 1996 (acts forthcoming in polltcness. and in particular in the use of rhanks, see Held -Negative politeness is abstentionist or compensotory rn nature: it consists in avoiding FTA occurrence, or in sotiening its formulation by any means.
-Positive politeness has. on the contrary, a, productioni.st character: it consists in performing anv flattering act for one or the other face of the addressee.
I rvould like to add that, unlike Brown and Levinson. I consider that, in the global system. positive politeness legitirnately holds as important a position as that of negative politeness : being polite in interaction merns producing FEAs as much as softening the expression of FTAs -_ and even more so: in fact. negative politeness is basically a restricted impoliteness, nlore or less neutraiized by some redressive action; but positive politeness is 'genuine politeness' (praise rs even rnore polite than softened criticism; the expression of agreement is elen rnore pohte than a mitigated disagreement, etc.). It is finaliy worth noting that this redefinition of negative/positive could also appiy to impoliteness,'negative impoliteness'consisting in not producing an expected FEA lgreetings, apologies, thanks...), and 'positive impoliteness' consisting in producing an unsoftened FTA that could even be strengthened by some kind of 'hardener' .
2.4. Starting from these distinctions, it is possible to lay down a system of politeness rzles somewhat different from B-L's system, which I think enables us to account coherently and efficiently for the functioning of politeness in different types of communicative exchanges. I cannot present this system in detail (cf. KerbratOrecchioni 1992: 183-320) . I shall simply say in this regard that: -these rules integrate both Brown and Levinson's propositions and Leech's (these two systems, which are sometimes presented as rivals, are in my opinion perfectly compatibie); -the whole systeni is based on the distinctions established previously between negativelpositive politeness and negative/positive face, but also on another preliminary distinction: the distinction betwee n othe r-o riented and s elf-oriented principles.
As a matter of fact, politeness is first a set of instructions about the behavior that the speaker must comply with towards his or her addressee (saving and flattering his faces). But these 'other-oriented' principles, that constitute politeness strictly speaking, conelativeiy imply other principles that concern the behavior that the speaker must adopt towards himself; thus, 'self-oriented' principles (among which there is, for instance, Leech' s'Modesty Maxim' ).
However, there is, at the same time, a striking dissymmetry between these two sets of rules since: -other-oriented principles are all favorable to the other person, who must be either treated tactfully (negative poiiteness) or be enhanced (positive politeness); -among the principles belonging to the second type (self-directed principles), some are favorable to the self, but uniquely in the defensive form; and some are even unfavorable: if one is allowed during interaction to protect one's faces, it is not recommended to enhance them in an ostensive way; furthermore, it may be recommended in certain circumstances to deprecate them (to damage one's own tenitory, or to belittle oneself by any self-criticism).
Polite conununication consists above all in putting forward other people's interests beJ'ore one'.e ovt'n.I shall illustrate this general principle with two examples: l.The'tve' of solidari4', that associates a common predicate to 'I' and'you': its use is polite provided that the predicate in question has somehow an enhancing feature; for example: "people of our height" is polite only if the addressee has the same or an inferior height than speaker's height, "people of our age" is polite only if the addressee is as old as, or older than the speaker.
If these conclitions are not fulfilled. the sentences r.vill prodLrce. on the conrrary, a boorishness effect (at ieast, in our socrety which ascnbes a positive value to youth ind tallne ss ).
). Tlrc contpuratiye trtechurtic's ctf thttnk.s curcl ctpoLoqie.s.
These are two e,rc.hanges thar have many'-analogies lCoulmas l9g1), being -eeneraily.composed of three constituents: the flrst one"is a preliminary act (gift oi offe.nse) that trrggers the actual ritual exchange, rtself madc oi'a polite ict (thaiks or apologies) ancl of its acceptance r,vhich often takes rhe shape of minimizing/denial of the gift or offense (in French'dc-rien'.'ce n'cst rien'. cf. in English'not;t all', ,don't mention it'). But the difterences between these two exchanges rire as interesting as their similaritres. 1or thev excellcntlv sum up the essence of lingiistic polite ness: . . . .The organization of these two exchanges logically ensues from the nature of the initial event that sets off the ritual Drocess: -As far as the central constitueni of the exchange is concerned (in both cases a FEA since it proceeds tiom a politeness concern): ' Thanks follow a FEA,. they must then be uttered by the second interactor (p2), who s.eek.s in this way to offset the gift by that kind of iymbolic paymenr repreienied by thanks. . The apology, on the contrarv, follows a FTA, it must then be the original-off'ense himelf/herself (Pl). who tries in this way least, this offense by an act of 'repairine' behavior. -As far as the third constituent of the exchange is concerned: ' In the first case. the gift is a positively-considered act (under the society concerned); therefore, its rninimization falls under rule' application); uttered by the author of to neutralize, tn part at the standards in effect in its author (P1: 'modesty 'In the second case, the offense is a negatively-considered act, and its minimization falls under its victim (P2).
.
As ah,vays, politeness consists in minimizing one's own merits ancl the other's snortcomlngs.
To conclude qn this question of politeness, I would say that a poiiteness theory like the one that Brorvn and Levinson recommend, although its^for-rndations are completeiy external to linguistics (face and_temitory notions areimported ones), may be extrernely useful to linguistic description. In fact, it enables us to give an account of a considerable mass of facts, which until now hacl been described in a disorganized manne r (as a part of classical rhetoric or contemporary pragmatics), but which slddenly appear.as a s)s/erzr if we look on them in the perspeciive of face-r.vork. We have just -seen a terv examples,.and so.many others coulclbe mentioned -indirect speech o.rt to begin with:.'*hy don't people alrvays speak directly (it r.vould be so much simpler for everyone)'l The answer is: to save the other's face and to protect one's own. When we want to give an order..why do we generally prefer overcomplicated expressions rather than the simplicity and clarity of readv-made imperatives? Th. ans*er is: because it is more polite. in other words: the cognitive cosi those forntulaticttts invoLve for both C at hein e Kerbrat -Orec c hioni Today, the analysis of talk-in-interaction is the scene of animated debates (for example, about the existence and the nature of conversattonal rules, or of pragmatic universals). It nourishes certain fashions (notions Iike'negotiation', or'strategy'), tt follows certain others (notions like 'prototype'3:, and of course, cognitivist concerns):
in short, in its maturity, the analysis of talk-in-interaction shows a flourishine vitalitv.
